










Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Grezes, J., & de Gelder, B. (2008). Social perception: Understanding other people's intentions and emotions
through their actions. In T. Striano, & V. Reid (Eds.), in Social Cognition: Development, Neuroscience and
Autism (pp. 5). Wiley-Blackwell.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
Chapter 5
Social Perception: Understanding 
Other People’s Intentions and 
Emotions through their Actions
Julie Grèzes and Beatrice de Gelder
Since most of the natural behavior of higher primates takes place within the context 
of social interactions, it is of interest to study the neural encoding of high-level social 
features, such as the emotional states or intention of another individuals. (Brothers, 
Ring, & Kling, 1990, p. 199)
Perceiving Other People’s Actions and Motor Resonance
Humans are adapted to living in social groups with complex patterns of social 
interactions. Understanding the meaning of other people’s behavior is an essential 
aspect of human communication, and a large amount of our daily life is spent 
watching and interpreting the actions of others (Barresi & Moore, 1996). The neural 
mechanism underlying our ability to represent others’ goals by the mere observa-
tion of their motor actions has been the target of considerable research. Behavioral 
experiments had suggested that the system for generating and representing actions 
is also used in the perception of actions (Knoblich & Prinz, 2001). This approach 
was strengthened by the discovery of “mirror” neurons in the macaque monkey 
brain, a class of neurons found in the parietal and the premotor cortex. They were 
seen to discharge not only when the monkey performed an action but also when 
the monkey was observing an experimenter or another monkey performing the 
same action (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992). Similarly, 
neuroimaging studies in humans have revealed parietal (PAR) and premotor (PM) 
activations both during execution and action observation, suggesting that action 
observation automatically triggers action representations (Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, 
& Passingham, 2003). The superior temporal sulcus (STS), involved in the percep-
tion of biological movements and in the observation of actions made by different 
body parts, was also active (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000). Finally, the corre-
spondence between perception and action was shown to be somatotopically J
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organized (Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006; Buccino et al., 2001; 
Gazzola, Aziz-Zadeh, & Keysers, 2006). Taken together these results provide support 
for the notion that, when one observes the action of another, the motor program 
of the observed action is activated in the observer’s brain, thereby suggesting that 
the observer uses his or her own motor system to perceive the action of others.
Infl uence of the observer’s motor abilities and of social relevance
Motor resonance seems to exist only for movements that respect the biomechanical 
constraints of our body, imposed by our skeleton and articulations, and that we are 
able to produce ourselves. Shiffrar and Freyd (1993) showed that it was possible to 
infl uence the subject’s perception by varying the time of presentation between 
pictures of body positions. For instance, the fi rst picture showed a person whose 
right forearm was over the left, while in the second picture the left was over the 
right. Under appropriate time conditions, observers reported seeing indirect 
trajectories that respected biomechanical constraints (for example, the left forearm 
turned around the right forearm), whereas, under shorter inter-stimulus intervals, 
subjects perceived direct and therefore biomechanically impossible trajectories (for 
example, the left forearm crossed the right forearm). Using positron emission 
tomography (PET), Stevens et al. (2000) investigated whether a change in brain 
activity accompanies this perceptual shift and demonstrated that premotor and 
parietal cortex were involved only during the perception of a biomechanically 
possible movement. Along similar lines, Buccino et al. (2001) observed less motor 
resonance when participants viewed images of actions by non-conspecifi cs. These 
fi ndings suggest that the brain system for action representations is selectively tuned 
to process actions that conform to the biomechanical and the joint constraints of 
normal human movement.
A person’s motor repertoire is constrained not only by human musculoskeletal 
anatomy but also by the skills that have been acquired and honed over time. For 
example, the motor simulation process is infl uenced by the individual motor 
abilities of each observer. During the fi rst recordings in monkeys, mirror neurons 
discharged when the monkey observed a grasping action performed by the hand of 
an experimenter, but were silent if the same action was performed with a tool (Riz-
zolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), an action that is not present in the motor reper-
toire of the monkey. This result suggests that action representations cannot strictly 
be based on observation alone, without concomitant motor action. To test this 
hypothesis, Grammont et al. (2006) trained their monkeys to grasp an object with 
a tool. They showed that the mirror neurons discharged to this type of action only 
after motor training, and that the responses were specifi c to the trained action and 
did not generalize to other tools. In humans, Reid, Belsky, & Johnson (2005) inves-
tigated individual differences in the development of the ability to perceive human 
action in 8-month-old infants. Their results clearly show that only young infants 
with relatively well-developed motor skills perceive the differences between possible 
versus impossible human movements. As for adults, functional magnetic resonance J
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imaging (fMRI) was used to study differences in brain activity between watching 
an action that one has learned to do and an action that one has not (Calvo-Merino, 
Glaser, Grèzes, Passingham, & Haggard, 2005). Greater activations in STS, PAR, 
and PM where observed when expert dancers viewed movements that they had been 
trained to perform compared to movements that they had not. This effect could 
not be explained by visual familiarity (Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, 
& Haggard, 2006). To conclude, during action observation, there is activity in the 
parietal and premotor cortex as the subject internally simulates perceived move-
ments, but the extent and level of activity within those regions will be constrained 
by the observer’s motor abilities.
Finally, a recent paper by Kilner, Marchant, & Frith (2006) elegantly demon-
strated that the activity during action observation is also modulated by social 
relevance – that is, by the degree of interaction between the actor and the observer. 
There is a modulation of activity only when the actor is facing the observer, and 
not when the actor is facing away.
Functions and possible limitations of motor resonance
This mechanism of shared motor representations was proposed as the basis of 
action understanding (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Grèzes & Decety, 2001; 
Iacaboni, 2005; Jeannerod, Decety, & Michel, 1994; Rizzolatti et al., 2001), and 
more recently it was suggested that it plays a role in action prediction (Csibra, 2007; 
Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Kilner, Vargas, Duval, Blakemore, & Sirigu, 2004; 
Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz, 2002). Fogassi et al. (2005), for example, 
demonstrated that the discharge of mirror neurons in monkeys during the observa-
tion of an act (grasping an object) is infl uenced by the type of act that follows it 
(for example, eating the food or putting it aside). Thus, these neurons not only code 
observed actions but also allow prediction of the next step of an action. In humans, 
the higher motor facilitation when subjects perceived the still picture of a hand 
caught in an ongoing but as yet incomplete grasping action pleads in favor of a role 
of motor simulation in anticipating the actions of others (Urgesi, Candidi, Ionta, 
& Aglioti, 2006). According to Gallese (2006), the mechanism of motor simulation 
could participate in interpreting the simple intentions of others.
Indeed, social interactions are less simple and less predictable than interactions 
between physical objects. Using transcranial magnetic stimulation, Gangitano, 
Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone (2004) studied the observation of predictable and 
unpredictable grasping movements in human subjects. The profi le of cortical excit-
ability suggested that a motor representation of the perceived action was activated 
as soon as the action started. However, once it had been activated, it tended to 
proceed toward its completion, regardless of whether the end of the action was the 
same or not – that is, was predictable or unpredictable. Furthermore, using fMRI, 
we scanned subjects while they watched alternate videos of themselves and of others 
lifting a box, and judged whether the actors had a correct (predictable action) or 
false expectation (unpredictable and accidental action) about the weight of the box. J
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A parietal-premotor circuit, which refl ects motor simulation, was activated during 
action perception. Still, the activity within this circuit did not dissociate unpredict-
able from predictable actions (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004a. These results 
support the idea that the internal simulation of a perceived action plays a crucial 
role in predicting how the perceived movement will continue. But they also suggest 
that the motor simulation process does not dissociate intended from unintended 
actions or predictable from unpredictable ones and therefore may not be suffi cient 
to understand the complex intentions of other people during social interactions. 
Still, it is suggested that the mirror neuron system, originally found in motor-
related areas, could play an important role in social cognition (Gallese, 2006; but 
see Sommerville & Decety, 2006, for a discussion).
Understanding Other People’s Intentions and 
Emotions from their Actions
The term “social cognition” proposed by Brothers (1990) is defi ned as “the process-
ing of any information which culminates in the accurate perception of the disposi-
tion and intentions of other individuals.” Premack (1978) coined the notion of 
“theory of mind,” thereby referring to a hypothetical mental mechanism whereby 
social agents attribute mental states to each other. Since the mid-1990s, develop-
mental psychology, social psychology, and neuroscience have investigated this 
ability (see reviews by Frith & Frith, 2003; Frith & Frith, 2006), using mostly verbal 
and static stimuli. Brain regions involved in the ability to infer mental states to 
others that have come to the foreground are the STS, the amygdala (AMG), the 
medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (see review by Gallagher & Frith, 2003). These regions 
fi gure prominently as components of the social brain (Brothers 1990). The research 
on theory of mind has developed in parallel and independently from the research 
on action understanding. None of the experiments had explored the ability to 
understand mental states through the observation of dynamic human behavior, and 
therefore the question whether motor simulation sustains mental states attribution 
remains.
Violation of expectations
Subjects were scanned while watching videos of actors lifting a box. They were asked 
to judge whether the action refl ected a correct or a false expectation of the weight 
of the box (Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004a or the intent to deceive about the 
weight of the box (Grèzes, Berthoz, & Passingham, 2006; Grèzes, Frith, & Passing-
ham, 2004b). We found activations in the parietal and premotor cortex, suggesting 
that motor simulation was involved. However, when the subjects judged that the 
actors had a false expectation or an intent to deceive, there was also activity bilater-
ally in the STS, lateral orbitofrontal, and cingulate cortex. The inference that the J
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actor was trying to deceive or had a false expectation was the difference between a 
prediction made by the observer and the action as perceived. People have a bias to 
judge other people’s behavior as truthful (Levine, Park, & McCornack, 1999) and 
of attributing true beliefs to others’ understanding of information (Bartsch & 
Wellman, 1995) that infl uence their predictions. The same biases were observed in 
our studies. Thus, the activations listed above may relate to the violation of the 
subject’s prediction. In the STS, it was demonstrated that, when an observer’s pre-
diction was violated, the activity was higher compared with the situation in which 
the observer’s predictions were met (Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 
2003; Saxe, Xiao, Kovacs, Perrett, & Kanwisher, 2004). The cerebellum may play a 
key role in signalling sensory discrepancy between predicted and actual conse-
quences of movements (Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 2001). Finally, activity in the 
orbital frontal cortex, as well as in the STS, has been reported when subjects per-
ceived a mismatch between what they expected and what actually happened 
(Downar, Crawley, Mikulis, & Davis, 2001). We conclude that activations in the 
STS, cerebellum, and orbitofrontal cortex are best explained as refl ecting the viola-
tion of the predictions made by the observer. When predictions are violated, the 
observer must update his or her representation of the mental state of the actor.
Communicative intent and personal involvement
Action observation can produce a strong emotional response, and can potentially 
induce or modify an observer’s behavior, particularly when the content of the per-
ceived action is directed at the observer him or herself. For example, it is particularly 
important to be able to distinguish whether a person is being honest or deceitful. 
Investigating this issue, we observed that communicative intent (deceit versus false 
expectation) and personal involvement infl uence the neural responses associated 
with the detection of deceit. Activations in the MPFC and AMG were found only 
for communicative intent as compared to non-communicative actions (Grèzes, 
Frith, & Passingham, 2004b. In the second study (Grèzes, Berthoz, & Passingham, 
2006), subjects judged whether actors had been deceived about the real weight of a 
box. Personal involvement was manipulated by having the participants themselves 
among the actors. The STS and anterior cingulate cortex were activated irrespective 
of whether the participants detected that they themselves had been deceived by the 
experimenter or whether the other person had been misled. In contrast, the crucial 
factor determining AMG activation is subjective involvement, as there was activity 
in the AMG only in the condition in which participants observed themselves being 
deceived. The amygdala is said to play a key role in fast and automatic evaluation 
of the social signifi cance of an event – for example, when the event constitutes a 
potential threat (Adolphs, 2003; Dolan, 2002). More importantly, Gloor (1972) 
reported that AMG stimulation induces subjective experiences of behavioral 
attitudes of others that the patients perceive as being directed at them (Gloor, 1972, 
cited by Brothers, 1990). However, Berthoz, Grèzes, Armony, Passingham, & Dolan 
(2006) contained judgments that were about social deception. We interpret the J
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activation of the AMG in this situation as refl ecting the greater emotional reaction 
elicited when the deceived one is oneself. In the same vein, we found more activity 
in the AMG when participants read stories narrating their own as opposed to others’ 
intentional transgression of social norms (Berthoz et al., 2006).
These results suggest that, while simulation can be a predictive mechanism 
playing a role in the implicit understanding of other people’s dispositions, mental 
states attribution also involves other brain areas that are part of a neural system 
underpinning the social brain. Prominent among these are the brain areas 
that process the type of action, its social context, and the observers’ personal 
involvement.
Emotional contagion and motor simulation
If we grant that simulation may play a role in social cognition, it is also likely to be 
involved in perceiving actions that have a strong emotional component. It was 
demonstrated that a mechanism of shared representations, originally found in the 
motor-related areas, applies to emotions and sensations. The same brain areas (for 
example, the insula and anterior cingulate cortex) are involved when subjects 
experience disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) or pain (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; 
Singer et al., 2004), and when they observe someone else experiencing the same 
emotion. Also, observing someone being touched elicits activity in the same area 
of the somatosensory cortex as being touched oneself (Blakemore, Bristow, Bird, 
Frith, & Ward, 2005; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). Thus, a direct and implicit form of 
understanding others is achieved by embodied simulation (Gallese, 2006). This 
ability to share other people’s emotions facilitates social communication and social 
coherence, and may be at the origin of altruistic behavior and cooperation (see the 
review by de Vignemont & Singer, 2006).
But there is also support in the literature for a second mechanism involving both 
the action and the emotion circuits. Recent neuroimaging data show that perceiving 
emotional facial and body expressions presented as video fi lms elicits activations 
both in the regions underlying motor representations (the premotor cortex) and 
also in the regions involved in emotional processing (the AMG) (Carr, Iacoboni, 
Dubeau, Mazziotta, & Lenzi, 2003; Decety & Chaminade, 2003; de Gelder, Snyder, 
Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; Grèzes, Pichon, & de Gelder, 2007; Grosbras 
& Paus, 2006; Sato, Kochiyama, Yoshikawa, Naito, & Matsumura, 2004). It is, 
however, an open question whether the critical factor for understanding actions 
with an emotional component is the activity within motor-related areas as such (the 
mirror system) or the interaction between the emotion-processing areas and an 
action-related network. One explanation for enhanced activation in the premotor 
cortex for dynamic expression of emotion is that, when dynamic fear bodies are 
being viewed, an important priority for the brain is to represent the perceived 
emotional action. This would be in line with the fi ndings of Adolphs, Tranel, and 
Damasio (2003) that patient B with extensive lesion of the ventral pathway, which 
includes the AMG, is able to recognize emotions from a dynamic facial expression J
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but not from a static one. A second possible explanation takes into account that 
emotions are adaptive in the sense that they prepare the organism for a behavioral 
response to the current environment (Darwin, 1872; Lazarus, 1991; LeDoux, 2000; 
Panksepp, 1998). The enhanced activation in the premotor cortex could be due to 
the fact that the perception, for example, of a fear stimulus (whether this is a sound, 
face, or body) triggers a fear reaction in the observer that is based on activation of 
a fear motor program encoded in subcortical and cortical circuitry (Tomkins, 1963) 
and does not involve mirror neurons. Further investigations are needed to disen-
tangle whether the activations detected in motor-related areas during the percep-
tion of emotional action reveal either the motor simulation of the action perceived 
or the preparation of the motor response that would be appropriate to the 
situation.
To conclude this section, starting from the postulate that the resonance 
phenomenon plays a role in social cognition, it is probably just a step in the chain 
of components necessary for adaptive behavior to the physical and social environ-
ment. Moreover, for this contagion mechanism to have explanatory value, its 
relationships with the other components must be clarifi ed. This issue is a fortiori 
important to explain whether a dysfunction of the mirror system can infl uence 
the problems of communication and social interaction observed in autistic 
syndromes.
Implication for Autism and Conclusion
Autism is a complex disorder that is heterogeneous in its phenotypic expression 
and its etiology. Nonetheless, it is usually defi ned on the basis of common symp-
toms, and its core defi cit is in poor social communication, a lack of imagination, 
the inability to understand others as intentional agents, a lack of empathy, imitation 
defi cits, and stereotypical behaviors. These socio-cognitive defi cits may be related 
to structural and functional abnormalities of many brain areas of the social brain: 
the STS, the AMG, the OFC, and the ACC (e.g. Abell et al., 1999; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2000; Boddaert & Zilbovicius, 2002), and more recently with the mirror 
system (Hadjikhani, Joseph, Snyder, & Tager-Flusberg, 2007; Williams, Whiten, 
Suddendorf, & Perrett, 2001). There are currently many lines of research on the 
possible causes of impaired social communication and of defi cits in processing 
emotional cues. Briefl y, some authors think the social defi cit could be a conse-
quence of an AMG dysfunction, leading to functional abnormalities that impair the 
ability to detect socially relevant visual cues (Baron-Cohen et al., 2000). Another 
model speculates that this impairment may be the consequence of a malfunctioning 
mirror system (Williams et al., 2001), generating a defi cit in the ability to represent 
the actions of others, and impairing higher-level cognitive functions involved in 
building intersubjectivity (Gallese, 2001).
Three recent studies have shown, however, that, in high-functioning individuals 
with autism, the system matching observed actions onto representations of one’s J
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own action is intact in the presence of persistent diffi culties in higher-level process-
ing of social information (Grèzes, Wicker, & de Gelder, forthcoming; Magnée, 
Stekelenburg, de Gelder, van Engeland, & Kemner, 2005; Sebanz, Knoblich, Stumpf, 
& Prinz, 2005). This raises doubts about the hypothesis that the motor contagion 
phenomenon – “mirror” system – plays a crucial role in the development of socio-
cognitive abilities. One possibility is that this mirror mechanism, while functional, 
may be dissociated from socio-affective capabilities. In healthy subjects, a co-
 activation of those regions underlying motor resonance, on the one hand, and 
emotional processing (de Gelder, Snyder, Greve, Gerard, & Hadjikhani, 2004; 
Grèzes, Wicker, & de Geldre, forthcoming) or detection of intentions, on the other 
(Grèzes, Frith, & Passingham, 2004a, 2004b) is observed. A dissociation between 
these two mechanisms in autistic subjects seems plausible in the light of studies 
reporting problems in information processing at the level of the STS and the AMG 
(Boddaert et al., 2004; Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002) and problems in con-
nectivity between these two regions. The superior temporal sulcus is, indeed, a brain 
region common to these three domains of motor and emotional contagion as well 
as intention detection. The data on the motor contagion for emotional expressions 
in autistic subjects do not address the issue of the feelings and emotional conscious-
ness of these subjects, and the available results on the emotional contagion in 
autistic subjects are contradictory (Blair, 2003). Interactions between neural 
structures implied in intention and emotion recognition through action are an 
important topic for future research.
Finally, future studies also need to address the issue of variability between 
individuals, which is considerable (Frith, 2001) but is rarely taken into account in 
mind-reading tests or in neuroimaging studies using small samples. Correlation 
analyses between structure, function, and behavior will undoubtedly provide useful 
information for a better defi nition of neuro-cognitive phenotypes associated 
with inadequacy in everyday social relations that are the core defi cit in autism, 
as well as for other psychiatric pathologies (for example, schizophrenia and 
personality disturbances) and degenerative neurological disorders (for example, 
fronto-temporal dementia). In the future a better characterization of these pheno-
types will contribute signifi cantly to more focused investigations into the genetic 
basis of these diseases (Leboyer Jamain, Betancur, Mouren-Siméoni, & Bourgeon, 
2002) and for the development of therapeutic approaches (Baranek, 2002). More 
generally, an understanding of the cerebral mechanisms involved in the develop-
ment of intersubjectivity in healthy subjects and of low-level mechanisms of social 
interactions is of great social relevance and promises new insights in these complex 
abilities.
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